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ABSTRACT 
 
Youth Unemployment in Europe and the United States* 
 
This paper focuses particularly on youth unemployment, why we should be concerned about 
it, why it is increasing again, how the present difficulties of young people entering the labour 
market differ from those of the past and what useful lessons have been learned that may 
guide future policy. We focus on Europe and USA, but introduce evidence from other 
countries where appropriate. Our analysis of the UK NCDS birth cohort data provides 
evidence supporting the notion that early adulthood unemployment creates long lasting scars 
which affect labour market outcomes much later in life. Our chosen variables are weekly 
wages and happiness. Our results show significant effects at age 50 from early adulthood 
unemployment. These affects are stronger than more recent unemployment experiences. 
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"Young people have suffered a disproportionate share of job losses during 
the global economic crisis. Many governments have boosted spending on 
programmes to help them. But with the economic recovery still fragile and 
fiscal pressures mounting, there are concerns that many will be left behind 
and could face years of unemployment."  
Off to a good start? Jobs for youth, OECD, 15th December 2010. 
 
Youth unemployment is one of the most pressing economic and social problems 
confronting those countries whose labor markets have weakened substantially since 2008, 
following the near-collapse of worldwide financial markets.  There is an element of déjà 
vu around this development: youth unemployment first became a serious problem for 
industrialized countries during the 1980s.  While labour markets were booming in the 
early part of this century, youth unemployment was still a concern.  But the particularly 
rapid increase in youth unemployment during the current recession has again sharpened 
attention on this issue.  
This paper focuses particularly on youth unemployment: why we should be concerned 
about it, why it is increasing again, how the present difficulties of young people entering 
the labour market differ from those of the past and what useful lessons have been learned 
that may guide future policy.  We focus on Europe and USA, but introduce evidence 
from other countries where appropriate.   
 
Table 1 presents evidence on the increase in quarterly youth unemployment rates over the 
recession.  In the EU as a whole, rates have increased from 14.7% at the beginning of 
2008 to over 20% in 2010Q3.1  Youth unemployment has risen sharply in Estonia 
(+20.7), Ireland (+18.4), Latvia (+23.2), Lithuania (+26.1) and Spain (+21.6), with 
percentage point increases in parentheses.  Interestingly, in all these countries there have 
been sharp declines in house prices over the Great Recession.  A direct link to the youth 
labour market may derive from the disproportionate number of the young who work in 
construction, which has suffered particularly from the effects of property price bubbles. 
 
Some countries have been strikingly successful in keeping youth unemployment down.  
Strikingly, Germany has actually experienced a decrease in youth unemployment rates, 
down from 10.2% in 2008Q1 to 8.8% in 2010Q3. The general impact of short-term 
working subsidies and the particular effects on the youth labour market of the German 
system of dual vocational training are candidate explanations for this success.    
 
Of particular concern is the rising number of young people disconnected from both 
education and the labour market.  On average in the OECD, almost 11% of all young 
people aged 15-24 were NEET (Not in Education nor in Employment or Training) in 
2008. Of these, 33% had been unemployed for less than a year, 7% were unemployed for 
more than a year, and 60% were inactive without studying.  
 
                                                 
1 According to the OECD youth unemployment, ages 15-24 also increased in Australia (2008=8.9%; 
2009=11.6%); Canada (11.2% and 15.3%); Japan (7.2% and 9.1%); Korea (9.3% and 9.8%) 
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Recent data up to the second quarter of 2010 suggest that during the past two years, the 
NEET proportion among the population aged 15-24 increased by almost 2 percentage 
points in OECD countries and in Europe. The OECD (2010) noted that by mid-2010 in 
the 26 OECD countries in which data are available, the proportion of youth aged 15-24 
who were not in education, employment or training, stood at 12.5% of the total 
population aged 15-24, up from 10.8% in 2008. This represents 16.7 million young 
people, 10 million of whom were inactive and not studying, and 6.7 million of whom 
were unemployed.  The OECD projects that youth unemployment rates will remain high 
at around 18% in 2011 and 17% in 2012 after a small decline in 2010.2    
 
To analyze the increase in youth unemployment, we examine the most recently available 
micro-data files to paint a picture of unemployment in general and youth unemployment 
in particular across countries on a comparable basis controlling for personal 
characteristics. These are mostly based on survey responses by individuals, but we also 
make use of a company level survey in Europe.  Strikingly, the influences on the 
likelihood of an individual being unemployed are very similar across most countries and 
over time. 
 
We find that youth unemployment has broadly similar features across countries, being 
heavily concentrated among the least educated.  However, young people are optimistic 
about the future and particularly happy.  Unemployment lowers the happiness of the 
young, but less so than it does for older workers.  In part this may arise from the fact that 
a high proportion of young people in many countries continue to live with their parents, 
which may lessen the impact of being unemployed (Card and Lemieux, 2000, Chiuri and 
Del Boca 2008).  Despite this, we find evidence that spells of unemployment when young 
tend to leave permanent scars.  
 
A great deal of what is known about the youth labor market comes from a series of 
research volumes published by the National Bureau of Economic Research.  These were 
based primarily, but not exclusively on research done in the United States (Freeman and 
Wise, 1982; Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000). The OECD has updated the evidence on 
youth through its recent analysis of youth labour markets in sixteen countries.3 
 
1. The effects of the Great Recession on youth labour markets 
Table 2 reports how some of the mature economies have been impacted by the recession.  
It shows how GDP by country changed from the first quarter of 2008 to the third quarter 
of 2009 - the period generally associated with the “recession” phase. It also shows the 
extent of growth during the “recovery” phase – which thus far stretches from the fourth 
quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2010.  
                                                 
2 OECD youth unemployment rates were  2002=13.4%: 2003= 13.8%; 2004=13.7%; 2005=13.4%; 
2006=12.5%; 2007=12.0%; 2008=12.7%; 2009=16.4%.  Source: OECD. 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/youth-unemployment-rate_20752342-table2  
 
3 Studies are available in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Spain, the UK and the USA at  
http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3343,en_2649_34747_38019131_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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Some countries, such as the Baltic States and Ireland, suffered double digit falls in 
output. The output of the European Union as a whole fell by 4.6% during this 
recessionary phase - much sharper fall than the 3.8% drop in output experienced in the 
United States.  The recovery has been much less strong in some parts of Europe than it 
has been in the US, in terms of the proportion of the drop in GDP that has since been 
recovered.- by 2010Q2, output in the EU was still 3% below its level at the start of 2008. 
In Western Europe, Germany, Denmark and Sweden have experienced rapid growth: but 
growth in Spain, Italy, Ireland and France has been much weaker. 
 
Table 2 also includes information on changes in employment from the start of the 
recession (2008Q1) to the most recently available observation (2010Q2). Employment in 
the European Union fell by 1.3% over this period. Again, in some countries the change 
has been much more dramatic with Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania and Estonia 
experiencing double-digit reductions in employment. In contrast, some countries have 
experienced small increases in employment. These include Germany, Austria, Sweden 
and Norway.  
 
While all of the mature economies were affected by the financial crisis, the responses of 
both their product and labour markets have been very diverse. And indeed, while there is 
a general correlation between changes in output and changes in employment across 
countries, it is by no means uniform. Thus, for example the US and Spain both 
experienced falls in output of around 4% during the recession. Employment in the US fell 
by almost 8% while in Spain it fell by 9.4%. In contrast, output in the UK dropped by 
6.2% but employment fell by only 1.7%. And there is an even greater contrast with 
Sweden, where output fell by 6.9% between 2008Q1 and 2009Q3, but employment 
actually grew between 2008 and 2010.  
 
For the EU as a whole, the overall fall of 1.3% in employment during the recession 
comprises a 2.5% reduction in full-time employment and a 4.2% increase in part-time 
employment. In the US, the response is even starker, with full-time employment falling 
by 7.9% while part-time working increased by 10.1%. Reductions in hours of work as a 
response to the recession in the UK, has been documented in Bell and Blanchflower 
(2010, 2011).  They find that many workers would prefer to work longer hours, but that 
employers are unwilling to purchase these hours. However, reduced hours may still be a 
rational strategy for both employers and employees who do not wish to dissipate the 
specific human capital that they may have jointly accumulated.  They also find that not 
only is unemployment prevalent among the young, so is underemployment. 
 
The young do not generally possess much specific human capital. And as a result, it is 
perhaps not surprising that they have been particularly affected by this recession. There is 
evidence that the youth labour market is especially volatile. When aggregate 
unemployment increases, youth unemployment tends to rise as firms cease hiring. This 
hurts new entrants. If firms decide to reduce their workforce and use last-in first-out 
(LIFO) rules to determine who is made redundant, the young are often the first to be 
fired.  The recession has made it particularly difficult for young people to make a 
successful transition from school to work.   
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The first panel of Table 3 presents data on the relationship between youth and adult 
unemployment rates. The second panel shows unemployment rates for all ages.  First, it 
is clear that youth unemployment rates are always higher than adult rates in every 
country.  Second the ratio of youth to adult rates tended to rise in 2008 as the recession 
started to bite and as national unemployment rates started to rise.  Subsequently in most 
countries youth unemployment rates have stabilized or fallen back slightly, perhaps as a 
result of specific government policies to help younger workers.   
 
One response to rising youth unemployment has been to return, or prolong, full-time 
education (Rice, 1999).  This implies that the 16-24 cohort are now better qualified than 
they were during the last recession. In the UK, 5.8 per cent of 16-24 year olds were 
graduates in 1993, while in 2008 that share had risen to 13.2 per cent. The improvement 
in qualifications is more concentrated among females than males. By 2008, the 
proportion of females aged 18-24 with no qualifications had fallen to 4.6 per cent, but for 
males was still over 7 per cent. In the UK, applications to attend university are up sharply 
since 2008.4  Employment subsidies have also helped young people to find jobs as they 
lower their relative price. 
 
Table 4 presents employment rates for 15-24 year olds at the start of the recession in 
2008Q1 and the latest data at the time of writing for 2010Q2.  Employment rates for 
youngsters in most countries have fallen, but there are four exceptions where they have 
increased - Austria, Finland, Romania and Sweden.  Unemployment rates for the least 
educated in the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categories 0-
2 jumped sharply in many countries with the biggest increases in Ireland, Latvia, and 
especially Spain that have high youth rates (Table 1).5 Interestingly youth employment 
rates also increased for the most educated (ISCED 5-6) in a number of countries, notably 
Finland, France and Sweden The unemployment problem of this age group is not solely 
the preserve of the uneducated. 
 
In Table 5, we analyze how the probability of being unemployed has varied through time 
and by age group in the USA and Europe. We use two micro-datasets: the Mannheim 
Trend file (supplemented with Eurobarometer data in 2010) and the Current Population 
Surveys in the United States.  The European data cover Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK. We apply the same 
set of controls – gender, schooling and country (state in the USA) to each dataset. We 
report the coefficients on the various age dummies from a number of individual 
regressions.  The coefficients in Table 5 indicate that the incidence of unemployment is 
increasingly falling on the young, and, as in the 1980s, recession is greater in Europe 
currently than in the United States.  In 2010, it is 17 percentage points higher among 15-
24 year olds in Europe in comparison to 45-54 year olds compared with just 7.6 
                                                 
4 As of Monday 22nd November 2010 total applications were up 11.7% compared with the same date in 
2009.  
5 http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm   
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percentage points in the USA. Although this is a continuation of previous experience, it is 
worth noting that this recession is unusual in that the overall unemployment rate in the 
US has risen above the European rate for the first time in some decades. But youth 
unemployment problems continue to be more severe in Europe than in the USA. 
 
Table 6 provides a supply-side explanation of the rise in youth unemployment.  The 
youth cohort is large at a time when the labor market is in the doldrums.  The table 
reports the relative size of the number of 5, 19, 15 and 25-year olds compared to the 
number of 20-year olds which is set to 100. The decline in the youth cohort is especially 
marked in the Baltic countries.  Progressively shrinking cohorts will have dramatic 
effects on the number of entrants to the labour market over the next fifteen years or so. 
The decline is relatively small in the US compared with other countries, in part because 
of its relatively high rate of immigration.  Immigrants tend to be young.  By 2020 the 
number of twenty year olds in the Euro area will have dropped by twelve percent.    
 
The recession has reversed recent reductions in youth unemployment in the developed 
world. Like other groups on the margins of the labour market, the young tend to 
experience particularly high rates of unemployment during recessions. The current 
experience fits this pattern. However, the youth cohort is diminishing in size in most 
countries, suggesting that, in the future, an excess supply of younger workers is less 
likely to occur. 
 
Table 7 uses the 2009 Eurobarometer studies #71.2 from May-June 2009 and #72.1 from 
August-September 2009 to analyze the individual characteristics associated with having 
lost a job during the recession, being able to keep a job, and self-assessed ability to find a 
job.  Column 1 covers the whole sample, while columns 2 and 3 are restricted to those in 
employment.    
 
Males are more likely to have lost a job but they also have a greater confidence than 
females of being able to find a new job. Those aged 45 to 54 are significantly less likely 
to have lost their job than other age groups except those aged 65+.  Those aged 15-24 are 
most likely to have lost their jobs. They are confident in their ability to find a job, 
perhaps because they have greater flexibility both spatially and occupationally. 
 
Immigrants are significantly more likely to have lost their job and are less likely to 
believe that they can hold on to their jobs. Those with health problems have a similar set 
of beliefs. Among the countries, the results for Spain are particularly negative: 
respondents from Spain and Ireland are more likely to have lost a job, feel less secure in 
their ability to retain their job and also have little confidence in being able to find a job.   
 
Column 4 makes use of data from Eurobarometer #72.1 from August and September 
2009 to estimate an ordered logit where respondents are asked how optimistic they are 
about the future.  Youngsters are especially optimistic, and based on the 
youth*unemployment interaction term, the young unemployed are more optimistic than 
the adult unemployed, but are still less so than students or the employed.  The question is 
whether they are right to be optimistic given that they came of age in a recession?  
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In Table 8 we make use of a very recent Eurobarometer, conducted in May 2010 which 
contains information on attitudes to jobs. We test to see whether the young unemployed 
are different from the adult unemployed, by including an age<25*unemployed interaction 
term, which in all cases is statistically insignificant and hence they are not. 
 
In column 1 the theme of youngsters being especially optimistic is developed further.  
Here the respondents are asked for their expectations for employment in their country and 
whether they think it will be worse, the same or better over the next year.  Once again the 
young are more optimistic than all older age categories.  Men, the Swedes and the more 
educated are optimistic and the unemployed and the Greeks more pessimistic.   
 
Column 2 examines whether respondents feel that, after the financial crisis is over, the 
deficit should be increased to create jobs.  The young are supportive, as, unsurprisingly 
are the unemployed themselves, along with the Irish. The most educated are opposed. 
 
Respondents are asked to report the two most important issues they believe their country 
is facing from a list of ten.  By far and away the most important of these is 
unemployment, which was stated by over half of respondents followed by 43% who 
mentioned 'the economic situation in our country'.6  Column 3 has the dependent variable 
set to one if the respondent reported that unemployment was one of their two main issues 
and zero otherwise. The coefficients are estimates of the relevant probabilities.  The 
young are more likely than other age groups to say unemployment is the main problem 
as, unsurprisingly, are the unemployed.  The main countries where unemployment is high 
such as Ireland and Spain along with residents of a number of east European countries, 
including Latvia and Lithuania say this is a concern. 
 
Finally in column 4 we report a life satisfaction equation.  Happiness measures are of 
interest in themselves but also more broadly it appears that such scores are correlated 
with positive health outcomes (Blanchflower, 2009).  Happiness, for example, is 
associated with improved heart rate and blood-pressure measures of response to stress 
and lower risk of coronary heart disease.  Happy people even heal faster (Ebrecht et al, 
2004).  Consistent with the findings in the happiness literature, most people report 
themselves being happy.  We include a set of controls that are relatively standard in the 
literature including labour force status, gender, region, schooling and marital status, plus 
controls for smoking and exercise.  It is well known in the literature that the unemployed 
are unhappy and that is true here; we also observe that happiness is U-shaped in age with 
the young happiest.  Happiness is high in the Nordic countries, notably in Denmark, 
Iceland and Sweden.  
 
                                                 
6 The full set of responses with proportions mentioning the issue in parentheses.- unemployment (51%); 
economic situation (43%); rising prices/inflation (19%); crime  (18%); health are system (16%); pensions 
10%); taxation (8%); immigration (7%); educational system (6%); terrorism  (4%); housing (3%); the 
environment (3%); energy (3%) and defence/foreign affairs (1%). 
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2. Identifying the effects of past unemployment 
Attempts to identify the scarring effects of unemployment have a long history. Heckman 
and Borjas (1980), Ellwood (1982) and Corcoran (1984) made early contributions, with 
the former two papers exploring the econometric issues associated with identifying 
scarring, which is a form of state dependence. There are two main issues. First, 
individuals may differ in those fixed characteristics that influence their likelihood of 
experiencing unemployment. In contrast, state dependence implies changes in actual or 
perceived worker characteristics due to previous unemployment history. Thus 
correlations between current and past unemployment may incorrectly be viewed as causal 
rather than being the result of individual heterogeneity. Second, omitted exogenous 
variables that are serially correlated may induce spurious state dependence effects. 
 
Heckman and Borjas (1980) argue that there are three main forms of state dependence: 
They base their argument on a discrete-state continuous-time Markov process with an 
“employment” process and an “unemployment” process which respectively determine the 
probability of transition between these states. These probabilities are time invariant. Then 
it follows that the distribution of time in either state follows an exponential distribution 
which is independent of the time in the current state (Cox and Millar 1965). Thus the 
length of time in the current spell of unemployment does not affect the rate of transition 
out of this state and hence there is no state dependence. By changing the structure of this 
model, they formalize their three models of state dependence. 
 
In the first type, the event of unemployment alters the probability of being in the 
unemployed state. This is known as occurrence dependence and means that the chance of 
being unemployed at present increases with the number of previous unemployment 
spells. The second type, duration dependence, posits that the probability of staying 
unemployed depends on the length of the current unemployment spell and therefore 
requires relaxation of the time-invariance aspect of the Markov process. The third type is 
a natural extension of the second, and is known as lagged duration dependence and posits 
that the probability of unemployment depends on the lengths of previous spells of 
unemployment and not just the current spell. Heckman and Borjas further note that the 
probabilities of unemployment may vary both with time and, crucially for our 
application, age. 
 
The issue of finding a consistent estimate for the lagged duration dependence form of 
state dependence is analogous to the problem of finding a consistent estimator for a 
model with a lagged dependent variable and serially correlated errors. Estimators for the 
other forms are more complex. Consistency for the lagged duration dependence case can 
be achieved through the use of an appropriate instrument. Gregg (2001) investigated 
lagged duration dependence using the UK National Child Development Survey (NCDS). 
Seeking to explain whether individuals were unemployed at the ages of 28 and 33, he 
used local area unemployment at age 16 as an instrument for unemployment experience 
up to the age of 23. His argument for this instrument was that the local labour market in 
which individuals find themselves at age 16 is largely exogenous. Variations in 
conditions in these markets will explain some of the variation in early labour market 
experience strengthening its case as a valid instrument.  However, he acknowledges that 
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the local labour market will not be independent of parental characteristics, which may 
also influence children's subsequent labour market experience. This weakens the validity 
of the instrument. In general, it is difficult to find a truly exogenous instrument within the 
labour market. Interdependence is characteristic of the labour market, particularly if one 
takes account of serial correlation. Nevertheless, Gregg argues that his instrument “does 
at least take the unobserved heterogeneity back a generation” (P 637) His results suggest 
that the number of months of unemployment between the ages of 28 and 33 increases by 
two months for every three months spent unemployed before the age of 23. 
 
Gregg and Tominey (2005) also use data from the NCDS and apply the same 
identification strategy as Gregg (2001) and find that there is a significant wage penalty of 
youth unemployment on males even after controlling for education, region and a wealth 
of family and personal characteristics. Their results suggest a scar from youth 
unemployment of 13-21% at age 41 although this penalty was lower at 9-11% if 
individuals avoid repeat exposure. 
 
Taking a different approach, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) use a cohort-based argument 
to identify state dependence. They argue that the distribution of heterogeneity is constant 
across cohorts, but that cohorts have differential experience of unemployment because 
they enter the labour market at different stages of the economic cycle. They argue that 
current wages may be affected by past labour market experience since, in a world of 
long-term contracts, workers’ current wage will reflect the reservation wage of workers at 
the time they entered the labour market which in turn depends on unemployment rates at 
that time.  
 
Similar evidence that even youngsters who choose to go to college or university are hurt 
if they enter the labour market during a recession is provided by Kahn (2010). She has 
shown that the labour market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy 
have large, negative and persistent effects on wages. Lifetime earnings are substantially 
lower than they would have been if the graduate had entered the labour market in good 
times.  Furthermore, cohorts who graduate in worse national economies tend to end up in 
lower-level occupations.   
 
Research by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) suggests that the period of early adulthood 
(between 18 and 25) seems to be the age range during which people are more sensitive to 
macroeconomic conditions.  They find that being exposed to a recession before age 17 or 
after age 25 has no impact on beliefs about life chances.  However, youngsters growing 
up during recessions tend to believe that success in life depends more on luck than on 
effort; they support more government redistribution, but have less confidence in public 
institutions.  Recessions seem to adversely effect youngsters’ beliefs. 
 
Nordström Skans (2004) uses sibling fixed-effects to identify the effect of previous 
unemployment on current labour market outcomes. In a search theory of the labour 
market, individual outcomes may be affected by entirely random events. State 
dependence is indicated if the effects of these events persist. The use of siblings is aimed 
at controlling for other influences on labour market outcomes. Differences between 
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siblings that are correlated with early unemployment and subsequent labour market 
outcomes are controlled for using observed individual characteristics.  
 
Skans compares the siblings model with OLS estimates where unobserved individual 
components are proxied by observable family characteristics instead of the sibling fixed 
effect. This model requires strong identification assumptions to infer causation. All 
differences between individuals that are correlated with both initial unemployment and 
later labour market performance must be captured either by observed individual or family 
controls. 
 
The results from the siblings fixed-effects model show a significant negative effect on 
earnings for up to five years following initial unemployment. These effects decline over 
time and are consistent with a theoretical model where employers’ recruitment decisions 
are more influenced by recent unemployment spells. The individual-based model gives 
somewhat larger state dependence effects, which potentially, but not necessarily, suggests 
that OLS estimates are upward biased. 
 
In previous work (Bell and Blanchflower 2010) we examine the relationship between 
current unemployment and previous unemployment spells. We focus firstly on the 
negative effects of lagged unemployment durations on subsequent wages, building on the 
literature that not only includes Gregg and Tominey, but also Mroz and Savage (2006), 
Nickell et al. (2002) and Stewart (2000). The underlying argument is that prolonged 
spells of unemployment reduce human capital and act as a negative signal to employers, 
both of which are likely to adversely affect the future evolution of wages. The novelty of 
our approach is the use of the most recent data from a birth cohort study, the NCDS 
whose members were aged 50 at the time of the most recent sweep. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
Consider an equation of the form: 
 
  ( )0 ,..,it it it i i i ity x z f U U uτβ γ λ= + + + +  (1) 
where yit is some labour market outcome for individual i at time t, xit is a vector of 
personal characteristics, zit is a set of labour market characteristics, U0 … Uτ are 
characteristics of previous unemployment spells observed in τ previous time intervals. λi 
is a measure of heterogeneity for each individual and uit is the disturbance. This equation 
is sufficiently general to capture occurrence dependence, duration dependence and lagged 
duration dependence. From these possibilities, we focus on the lagged duration 
dependence due to the relative simplicity of the estimator. Thus our estimation equation 
is equation (2), which is a linear version of (1), where the length of unemployment spells, 
tUL , is used to capture state dependence.    
 
  00 ..
U U
it it it i i i ity x z L L uττβ γ µ µ λ= + + + + + +  (2) 
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Our data comprises a cohort study where data have been collected at irregular intervals. 
Past unemployment spells will have been observed when members of the sample are at 
the same age. Hence the coefficients are both time and age specific. If the effects of 
unemployment on outcomes decline through time, one would expect µ0 >> µτ. On the 
other hand, if early spells of unemployment have scarring effects, this expectation would 
be reversed i.e.   µ0 << µτ. Further, if lagged unemployment is driven by fixed individual 
heterogeneity, then one would not expect to see large changes in the µ coefficients if 
local labour market conditions are controlled for. 
 
If unobserved heterogeneity affects individuals’ lifetime propensity to become 
unemployed, then one might expect positive correlation between the λi and Uj which 
would cause an upward bias in the coefficients on the Uj. One way to reduce this effect is 
to increase the number of individual controls. Another is to instrument unemployment 
spells. But it is also worth noting that the effects of past unemployment are likely to vary 
with the cycle.  
 
We can now add to the literature on scarring by exploring some new evidence using a 
specification similar to (2). Following Gregg and Tominey, we use the 1958 birth cohort, 
the National Child Development Study (NCDS).  The NCDS has followed a cohort of 
people who were born in one week - the 3rd to the 9th March 1958. There have been seven 
attempts to trace all members of this birth cohort to monitor their physical, educational 
and social development. The first three sweeps were carried out by the National 
Children's Bureau, in 1965, when respondents were aged 7, in 1969 (NCDS1), aged 11 
(NCDS2), in 1974, aged 16 (NCDS3). The fourth sweep, NCDS4, was conducted in 
1981, when respondents were aged 23. The fifth sweep was carried out in 1991, when 
respondents were aged 33 (NCDS5). For the sixth wave, conducted in 1999-2000, when 
respondents were aged 41-42 (NCDS6), fieldwork was combined with the 1999-2000 
wave of the 1970 Birth Cohort Study (BCS70).  The seventh sweep of NCDS was 
conducted in 2004-2005, when respondents were aged 46-47 years (NCDS7).  The eighth 
and most recent sweep was conducted in 2008-09 when the respondents were aged 50. 
 
In 1981, at age 23, there were 12,537 responses to the question of whether the respondent 
had ever been unemployed since the age of 16.  Unemployment rates in the UK had risen 
from 5.4% in 1979 to 6.8% in 1980 and 9.6% in 1981, when the UK had moved into 
recession.  Unemployment would eventually peak at 11.4% in the spring of 1984.  In the 
sample, 44% reported that at some time in their working lives they had been unemployed. 
The question is whether unemployment when young impacts outcomes later in life and 
whether the effect of an unemployment spell when young is greater than when older.  It 
turns out it is. 
 
Using the most recent data from the 2008-09 sweep, we estimate a wage equation. Our 
sample is therefore limited to 6,811 employees. To capture individual and labour market 
characteristics, we include controls for full-time/part-time status, permanent/temporary 
job, region (10), school dummies (8), industry dummies (59) and workplace size (4). To 
test for scarring, we include the number of months unemployd before age 23 as a 
regressor and also whether the individual was unemployed at age 46 – effectively lagged 
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unemployment.  This means that we exclude from our sample nearly a thousand 
employees of individuals who report their wages but who either did not respond to the 
fourth sweep of the survey (NCDS4) or did not report the number of months 
unemployed.   
 
Table 9 illustrates the difficulties of distinguishing scarring effects from individual 
heterogeneity. The information on IQ and math scores at age 11, and reading score at 16, 
suggest that these would be reasonably good predictors of months unemployed before age 
23. Yet, whether the cause is scarring or heterogeneity, adverse outcomes occur, and may 
indicate the need for policy intervention due to lost output as well as other social and 
economic costs.  
 
Our regression results are reported in Table 10.  The dependent variable is the log of 
weekly wages at age 50. We have around 6000 observations for our simplest regression. 
The sample size declines as we introduce additional controls. We focus on the 
coefficients on early unemployment and unemployment in 2004, which is effectively, 
lagged unemployment, since 2004 was the time of the previous observation. As 
additional controls are added the size of the coefficients on the unemployment variable 
decline as one would expect in the presence of heterogeneity. 
 
Following our earlier argument regarding the difficulty of finding appropriate instruments 
within the labour market, we use OLS, noting that in the Gregg and Tominey study, 
which uses the same dataset estimated over an earlier period, the IV results “are not 
largely different from the OLS estimates” (P 505).  
 
The addition of controls reduces the coefficient on months unemployed aged less than 23 
from -0.01382 to -.0092. Nevertheless the effect on current wages of cumulative 
unemployment experience when aged less than 23 is highly significant. The same cannot 
be said for unemployment in 2004, which is not significant even at the 10% level. Males 
are consistently and significantly more likely to be unemployed than females.  
 
Our results update Gregg and Tominey (2005) using the same data.  But our focus is on 
outcomes in the most recent sweep of the NCDS data at age 50.  We also find evidence of 
scarring. Our evidence supports the general notion that unemployment experience in 
early adulthood can have a continuing negative effect on labour market outcomes even up 
to 3 decades later. Conditional on early labour market experience, later spells of 
unemployment do not negatively impact wages. 
 
In Table 11 we examine a different outcome, again in the context of equation 1, self-
reported happiness at age 50.  The sample is larger because we now include all 
individuals and do not restrict the samples to employees as in Table 9.  The exact 
question asked is: on balance I look back on life with a sense of happiness (n=9845). 
Never=1%; not often=7%; sometimes= 34% and often 58%.  
 
Consistent with the findings in the happiness literature, most people report themselves 
being happy.  We include a set of controls that are relatively standard in the literature 
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including labour force status, gender, region, schooling and marital status, plus controls 
for smoking and exercise.  In column 1 we include months unemployed up to age 23 in 
an OLS regression and this enters significantly negatively. In column 3, we also include 
lagged unemployment variables, from NCDS7 and NCDS6 at ages 42 and 47. 
Interestingly, with this variant of equation 1, both are insignificant and the significance of 
the months unemployed early in life variable remains.  The two more recent lagged 
unemployment variables are insignificant in columns 3 and 4. So spells of unemployment 
while young lower happiness at age fifty, even though unemployment in the mid forties 
does not. And the extent of the decline in happiness increases with the number of months 
unemployed at this early age. 
 
Thus we have presented stark findings, consistent with much earlier evidence that youth 
unemployment lowers wages and happiness over thirty-five years later.  And the more 
months of unemployment when young, the bigger the effects. Our empirical strategy 
could potentially provide biased estimates. The extent to which it does so depends on the 
extent to which the experience of unemployment while young is simply driven by fixed 
effects: Some people may simply have a propensity for unemployment and the fact that 
there is something fundamentally different about them, rather than a result of their early 
labour market experiences, is why they are unemployed in later life. 
 
We cannot fully address this issue with the data to hand. But given that youth 
unemployment is correlated with a number of negative outcomes, our view is that it 
would be dangerous to conclude that youth unemployment is simply driven by genetics.  
Even if the scarring we have observed was driven by the unobserved fixed effects, it is 
unclear why this would matter for policy.  Policy should focus on reducing the harmful 
effects of youth unemployment whether individuals were scarred by earlier spells of 
unemployment or by some permanent disposition to being unemployed.  It is quite clear 
that the most harmful effects appear to be on the least skilled and least educated.  If there 
had been earlier interventions to help such individuals, they wouldn't be in a similar 
situation in their middle age.  The consequences of inaction may well be large. 
 
4. Conclusions  
In this paper we have documented the increase in youth unemployment since the start of 
the Great Recession. While youth unemployment rates have increased in almost all 
countries, there has been wide divergence in the size of this increase. There is evidence 
that the least educated have been hit hardest.  Particularly large increases have occurred 
in countries that have suffered house price declines crises such as Spain, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Ireland. In contrast, youth unemployment has remained relatively low in 
Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands 
 
The concern is that such spells of unemployment while young have long lasting effects, 
which would be bad for the individuals and for the countries themselves, potentially 
raising the natural rate of unemployment in the long run. Our micro-econometric analysis 
confirms that broadly the same specification provides a consistent explanation of higher 
rates of youth unemployment in Europe, the USA and the UK.  We also find that these 
specifications are also consistent through time in the UK and USA, though it appears that 
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the relative disadvantage of youth in the labour market has increased during the Great 
Recession. 
 
Our analysis of the UK NCDS data supports the notion that early adulthood 
unemployment creates long lasting scars which affect labour market outcomes much later 
in life. We focus on are weekly wages and happiness. Our results showed significant 
effects at age 50 from early adulthood unemployment that were much more significant 
than recent unemployment experience.  
 
Given these negative effects of early unemployment experience, the immediate policy 
response might therefore be to increase the demand for labour generally, or to seek to 
change the balance of demand in favor of younger workers. The most readily available 
lever for either of these approaches is fiscal policy.  But this should not be taken as 
suggesting that efforts to improve the education, skills and employability of the young 
should not also be a focus of policy intervention. This age group was not responsible for 
the recession. It should not be expected to pay for it through potentially long-run adverse 
labour market outcomes. 
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Table 1.  Quarterly Youth unemployment Rates, 2008-2010Q3 (%) 
  
  2010Q3     2010Q1 2009Q1 2008Q1 
European Union (27) 20.3 20.7 18.4 14.7 
Euro area (16) 20.0 20.2 18.4 14.7 
Austria 8.6 9.6 9.3 8.2 
Belgium 23.5 23.8 21.0 17.3 
Bulgaria 20.8 22.1 13.5 13.8 
Cyprus 20.8 18.7 10.9 9.1 
Czech Republic 17.7 19.3 12.8 10.0 
Denmark 14.7 13.4 9.1 7.2 
Estonia 28.1 39.6 24.0 7.4 
Finland 20.7 22.5 18.8 15.9 
France 24.2 23.4 22.9 17.9 
Germany  8.8 9.9 10.1 10.2 
Greece 32.1 29.7 24.4 22.5 
Hungary 27.2 27.0 24.6 19.7 
Ireland 28.5 27.1 20.5 10.1 
Italy 28.2 27.5 24.3 20.7 
Latvia 34.0 39.0 27.8 10.8 
Lithuania 35.3 34.1 23.6 9.2 
Luxembourg 18.4 17.4 18.6 15.4 
Malta 12.1 13.9 14.2 11.5 
Netherlands 8.7 8.9 6.7 6.2 
Norway 8.3 8.9 8.6 6.8 
Poland 22.8 23.3 18.1 17.8 
Portugal 23.0 21.9 19.1 15.8 
Romania 21.4 21.0 20.2 18.5 
Slovakia 32.0 32.9 22.3 19.1 
Slovenia 15.6 13.2 12.6 11.2 
Spain 42.4 39.9 34.7 20.8 
Sweden 24.8 26.3 22.5 18.9 
Turkey 19.3 21.1 22.8 17.0 
United Kingdom 18.9 19.7 17.9 13.8 
United States 18.2 18.7 15.7 11.5 
 
Source: Eurostat
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Table 2.  Employment Change and GDP in the Great Recession (%) 
                                Employment change                    GDP (at market prices) 
                                  2008Q1-2010Q2              2008Q1-2009Q3     2009Q4-2010Q2 
European Union -1.3 -4.6 1.6 
Euro area  -1.6 -4.2 1.5 
Austria 1.6 -2.9 1.6 
Belgium -0.2 -1.9 1.3 
Bulgaria -6.6 -1.6 -0.2 
Croatia -3.6 -5.1 -1.3 
Cyprus 2.1 -0.4 0.7 
Czech Republic -1.6 -3.3 1.8 
Denmark -2.7 -6.6 2.6 
Estonia -14.9 -22.3 4.4 
Finland 0.5 -8.4 2.3 
France 0.3 -3.1 1.5 
Germany  0.7 -4.1 3.0 
Greece -1.9 -1.1 -3.4 
Hungary -1.7 -7.1 0.6 
Iceland -3.2 -7.6 -4.6 
Ireland -12.9 -12.6 -1.5 
Italy -0.7 -6.2 0.8 
Latvia -17.7 -26.8 0.5 
Lithuania -12.1 -15.5 0.4 
Luxembourg  10.3 -3.9 0.9 
Malta 4.9 -0.1 2.5 
Netherlands 0.5 -3.9 2.1 
Norway 0.9 -2.3 0.4 
Poland 3.1 4.2 3.0 
Portugal -3.8 -3.0 1.3 
Romania 4.1 -2.8 -1.5 
Slovakia -3.3 -4.2 3.7 
Slovenia -0.3 -7.0 1.1 
Spain -9.4 -4.4 0.1 
Sweden 0.8 -6.9 4.0 
United Kingdom -1.7 -6.2 2.0 
USA* -7.9 -3.8 2.5 
 
Note: * January 2008-September 2010.  Source: Eurostat
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Table 3.  Ratio of youth to adult annual unemployment rates and national unemployment rates, 1983-2010  
                      October 2010  2008           2005-7          2000-4           1990-4        1983-4 
a) Ratio of age <25 unemployment rate to age 25-74 unemployment rate 
Belgium 3.28 3.05 2.98 3.01 2.74 3.02 
Denmark 2.49 3.04 2.33 1.80 1.49 2.33 
Germany 1.33 1.43 1.38 1.09 1.21   
Ireland 2.38 2.61 2.40 2.24 1.83 1.76 
Spain 2.34 2.51 2.54 2.73 2.99   
France 3.01 2.94 2.78 2.58 2.85 4.00 
Italy 3.79 3.79 3.98 3.41 4.57 7.22 
Netherlands 2.36 2.63 2.16 2.24 1.45 1.71 
Portugal 2.25 2.41 2.36 2.74 3.13 4.05 
Finland 3.37 3.37 3.01 2.80 3.02   
Sweden 4.21 4.88 4.20 3.16 3.18 3.48 
United Kingdom 3.24 3.85 3.85 3.22 1.94 2.30 
United States 2.27 2.78 2.89 2.77 2.46 2.34 
b) Total unemployment rates (%) 
Belgium 8.5 7.0 8.1 7.5 7.7 10.8 
Denmark 7.3 3.3 4.2 4.9 8.2 8.2 
Germany  6.7 7.3 9.6 8.5 7.4    
Ireland 14.1 6.3 4.5 4.3 14.7 14.7 
Spain 20.7 11.3 8.7 10.8 15.7    
France 9.8 7.8 9.0 8.8 9.9 8.5 
Italy 8.6 6.7 6.9 8.8 9.3 7.7 
Netherlands 4.4 3.1 4.4 3.6 5.3 8.2 
Portugal 11.0 7.7 7.9 5.3 5.1 8.6 
Sweden 8.1 6.2 6.9 6.3 5.8 3.5 
United Kingdom 7.7 5.6 5.2 5.0 9.0 10.9 
United States 9.8 9.3 5.8 5.2 6.5 8.6 
 
Source:  Eurostat
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Table 4.  Employment rates (%) by educational status ages 15-24 (ISCED, 1997) 
                                              All (ISECD 0-6)                        Pre-primary                    Upper/post-secondary                     Tertiary 
  2010Q3 2008Q1 2010Q3 2008Q1 2010Q3 2008Q1 2010Q3       2008Q1 
Austria 55.8 54.6 42.0 38.9 69.4 70.8 58.0 73.9 
Belgium 24.3 27.5 9.9 11.4 32.5 36.9 56.1 67.3 
Bulgaria 23.1 24.9 5.2 5.4 40.4 46.6 59.6 65.1 
Czech Republic 24.4 27.2 3.4 4.1 43.0 48.3 33.4 44.1 
Denmark 57.6 62.9 50.1 57.3 70.4 73.7 65.7 79.1 
Estonia 23.5 35.5 8.4 16.8 34.2 55.1 57.2 75.3 
Finland 43.0 39.3 26.9 20.1 63.5 59.5 87.4 79.9 
France 30.8 31.3 13.9 16.3 41.7 42.1 54.1 51.6 
Germany 45.2 47.5 32.1 34.8 63.4 65.7 71.7 83.8 
Greece 20.7 22.8 12.3 16.5 26.2 25.0 47.4 59.3 
Hungary 17.9 19.6 5.3 6.4 29.1 30.2 58.4 72.6 
Ireland 30.8 47.0 9.3 19.6 43.9 62.0 62.8 80.5 
Italy 20.5 24.2 12.3 15.0 30.9 36.1 29.3 30.7 
Latvia 26.1 40.1 9.9 17.7 37.9 60.4 76.9 87.9 
Lithuania 19.8 26.0 4.8 6.0 28.0 38.9 54.1 78.3 
Luxembourg 19.4 21.9 11.0 14.5 33.9 30.5 41.1 54.2 
Netherlands 66.0 68.0 56.8 59.2 75.0 77.3 79.6 81.5 
Norway 52.3 56.9 47.9 49.4 64.1 70.2 75.1 81.2  
Poland 26.3 26.6 6.6 6.5 41.8 42.3 52.8 66.9 
Portugal 27.9 34.9 26.0 34.2 29.4 32.3 39.2 61.3 
Romania 25.8 23.3 19.6 14.6 30.4 31.6 55.6 64.6 
Slovakia 20.6 27.3 1.8 2.2 37.2 47.4 36.0 66.7 
Slovenia 32.9 34.4 17.3 14.9 44.8 47.3 53.1 57.2 
Spain 26.2 36.5 24.4 38.4 28.3 36.3 47.2 57.0 
Sweden 43.7 39.0 26.6 22.4 63.7 64.6 68.1 53.1 
United Kingdom 47.1 52.4 34.2 43.2 55.2 60.5 72.8 81.0 
Notes: ISCED 0-2=Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education - levels 0-2. ISCED3-4 =Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary education - levels 3-4 (ISCED 1997).  ISCED levels 5-6 Tertiary education - levels 5-6 (ISCED 1997) 
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Table 5.  Estimated probability of unemployment  
 
USA 
                       1979        1982-83       2007          2010 
15-24 years.093  .126   .049  .076  
25-34 years .034  .057   .013   .024  
35-44 years  .009  .023   .003  .006  
55-64 years -.005  -.010  .003  -.001  
65+ years-.005  -.039   .004  -.008  
 
Europe 
           1975-82     1983-89 2007       2010    2010 (9 countries) 
15-24 years .096 .180 .131    .167  .170 
25-34 years .014 .045 .040   .037 .053 
35-44 years -.012 -.004 .009    -.004 .036 
55-64 years.029 .037 .041  .005    .020 
65+ years .028 -.002 -.042   -.060 .009 
 
Source: Mannheim Trend file and for 2010 #73.3 Eurobarometer and 2007 
Notes: Sample for 1975-1989 is nine EU countries; Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK.  Samples for 2007 
are all twenty-seven EU countries.  The final column is for the same 9 countries as for 
1975-1989.  Controls include gender, schooling and country or state.  Estimated with 
dprobit. 
 
 
Table 6.  Cohort size in 2008 (age 20 = 100) 
                                  5 years                 10 years                 15 years               25 years  
Euro area    88   88   93  111  
Denmark 105 112 114    98  
Estonia  59   55   76    93  
Finland   91   97 109  112  
Germany    74   83   86  103  
Greece   87   88   95  130  
Ireland 104   98   95  137  
Latvia   53   49   80    92  
Lithuania   53   66   94    87  
Netherlands 101   98 101    97  
Norway   99 107 109  100  
Spain   89   82   87  132  
Sweden   86   82 111    95  
UK   81   89   96    98  
USA   97 94 102  103  
 
 
Source: Eurostat
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Table 7.  Probability of having lost, ability to keep and likelihood of finding a new job, 
and degree of optimism, Europe, 2009 
                                        (1)                       (2)                            (3)                      (4) 
                                  Lost a job      Ability to keep job   Likely to find a job     Optimistic 
                                     probit               ordered logit               OLS               ordered logit 
Male   .0281 (9.82) .0429 (1.28)  .4003 (8.32)  .1003 (4.16) 
15-24*unemployed      .2859 (2.19) 
15-24 years   .0583 (8.02) -.1849 (2.39)  1.5383 (13.93)  .4662 (8.13) 
25-34 years   .0519 (9.11)-.2528 (4.26)  1.5242 (18.18)  .3190 (7.73) 
35-44 years   .0432 (8.06)-.2712 (4.74)  1.3761 (17.00) .1625 (4.11) 
55-64 years   .0422 (8.10)-.2187 (3.83)  .6696 (8.32) .0498 (1.14) 
65+ years -.0854 (17.83)-.0534 (0.35)  -.5358 (2.50) .1278 (2.45) 
ALS 16-19 -.0045 (1.08) .2430 (4.11)  .4980 (5.77)  .2249 (6.44) 
ALS 20+  -.0330 (7.62)  .7075 (11.37)  1.2023 (13.39)  .5253 (13.51) 
Still studying -.0682 (14.23)      .6080 (8.40) 
No FT education -.0028 (0.19)  .1959 (0.64) -.1431 (0.33) -.2084 (1.42) 
Home worker      -.0954 (1.95) 
Unemployed      -.4865 (9.64) 
Retired/disabled      -.2264 (5.16) 
Immigrant   .0756 (10.26)-.2730 (3.42) -.1719 (1.49)  
Health problems   .0158 (3.67) -.2885 (4.56)  -.6191 (7.04)  
 
cut1/constant   -3.5596  4.0107    -1.8505  
cut2    -1.9104   -.0170   
cut3     .1649    2.2223 
 
N                                   29,484                    13,462                13,129                   26,164       
Pseudo/Adjusted R2.1124  .0798 .1354 .0590  
 
Source: Columns 1-3 - Eurobarometer #71.2, May - June 2000.  Column 4 -
Eurobarometer #72.1, August-September 2009. 
Notes: Excluded categories, Age left school<16 and ages 45-54.  'Health problems' 
variable relates to whether the individual suffers from a chronic physical or mental health 
problem, which affects their daily activities.  In column 1 the dependent variable is set to 
one if the respondent says that "as a result of the economic crisis they have lost their job", 
zero otherwise and includes the full sample including those studying.  In column 2 the 
dependent variable is 'How confident would you say you are in your ability to keep your 
job in the coming months?  Are you not at all confident; not very confident; fairly 
confident or very confident? The equation is estimated as an ordered logit.  In column 3 
the question is "if you were to be laid-off, how would you rate on a scale of 1 to 10, the 
likelihood of you finding a job in the next six months? '1' means that it 'would be not at 
all likely' and '10' means that it 'would be very likely'.  T-statistics in parentheses.  In 
column 4 the question is 'please tell me whether you totally disagree (8.7%), tend to 
disagree (28.5%), tend to agree (44.0%) or totally agree (17.4%) with the following 
statement: You are optimistic about the future?  All equations also include 29 country 
dummies. 
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Table 8.  Attitudes and expectations, 2010 
                                           (1)                       (2)                        (3)                      (4) 
                                  Employment        Necessary to       Unemployment           Life  
                                  expectations          create jobs           main issue           satisfaction 
                                 Ordered logit        Ordered logit              Probit              Ordered logit 
Male    .0816 (3.46)  -.0439 (1.81) -.0199 (3.19) -.1083 (4.56) 
15-24*unemployed .0692 (0.61)  .1364 (1.12)  .0139 (0.45)  .1725 (1.51) 
15-24 years   .3658 (5.77)   .2017 (3.03)  .0493 (2.93)  .7983 (12.24) 
25-34 years   .3094 (7.56)   .0484 (1.15)  .0152 (1.40)  .3761 (9.11) 
35-44 years   .1685 (4.43)  -.0562 (1.44)  .0053 (0.53)  .1645 (4.31) 
55-64 years  -.0038 (0.09)   .0214 (0.51) -.0141 (1.30)  .1288 (3.12) 
65+ years   .0445 (0.88)   .0532 (1.01) -.0508 (3.82)  .4234 (8.31) 
Home worker -.0748 (1.54)  -.0133 (0.26)   .0288 (2.27) -.2595 (5.35) 
Unemployed -.1191 (2.73)   .1577 (3.40)   .1421 (12.35) -1.0957 (25.10) 
Retired/disabled-.0123 (0.30)  -.0407 (0.94) -.0054 (0.50)  -.2314 (5.54) 
ALS 16-19  .0401 (1.17)  -.0343 (0.95) -.0151 (1.70)  .3066 (9.06) 
ALS 20+   .2142 (5.67)  -.1555 (3.94) -.0346 (3.48)  .7817 (20.55) 
Still studying  .2634 (3.80)  -.1279 (1.77) -.0282 (1.54)  .8798 (12.35) 
No FT education-.0025 (0.02)   .0024 (0.02) -.0123 (0.37)  -.5343 (4.11) 
Living together .0640 (1.53)  -.0489 (1.13)  .0032 (0.29) -.2068 (4.83) 
Single  .0152 (0.42)  -.0532 (1.42) -.0083 (0.87) -.4421 (12.05) 
Divorced/separated-.0770 (1.69)  -.1234 (2.60)  .0060 (0.50) -.6695 (14.67) 
Widowed   .0466 (1.04)    .0284 (0.59) -.0265 (2.27)  -.5337 (11.93) 
Other EU state .3255 (4.67)   .1307 (1.89) -.0219 (1.20) -.1095 (1.61) 
Europe non EU .0724 (0.77)   .6146 (6.06)  .0434 (1.76) -.2596 (2.83) 
Asia/Africa/Latin .0693 (0.68)   .2933 (2.76)  .0158 (0.58) -.3784 (3.66) 
America/Japan .3858 (1.22)   .2610 (0.79) -.0780 (0.89)  .4890 (1.41) 
Austria  .6499 (7.67)   .5683 (6.66) -.0679 (2.98) -.1571 (1.77) 
Bulgaria  .3983 (4.57)  .6092 (6.13)  .0808 (3.61) -2.5190 (28.63) 
Croatia -.2970 (3.40)  .8936 (10.10)  .1716 (7.78) -.8078 (8.85) 
Cyprus -.6810 (6.04)   .5175 (4.69) -.0466 (1.68) -.2290 (2.08) 
Czech Republic .0444 (0.52)   .5587 (6.56)  .0311 (1.38) -.8571 (9.71) 
Denmark  1.4015 (16.33)   .8335 (9.85) -.0557 (2.44) 1.6625 (17.53) 
East Germany-.1181 (1.12)  -.0352 (0.33) -.0087 (0.31) -.8928 (8.24) 
Estonia   1.2726 (14.88)   .2446 (2.75)   .2445 (11.38) -1.1404 (12.98) 
Finland  .8308 (9.83)   .8371 (9.98)  .0833 (3.74)  .3291 (3.72) 
France  .1171 (1.38)  -.1218 (1.42)  .1404 (6.41) -.4543 (5.13) 
Greece   -1.2808 (13.37)  -.2708 (3.16) -.0111 (0.49) -2.3419 (26.54) 
Hungary   .8139 (9.63)   .2399 (2.80)  .1502 (6.82) -1.8973 (21.70) 
Iceland  1.0515 (10.19)  .8136 (8.19) .0853 (3.17)  1.0579 ( 9.62) 
Ireland  .0402 (0.47)     1.0639 (11.97)  .1870 (8.54)  .4466 (4.97) 
Italy   .1316 (1.54)    .1629 (1.84)   .0503 (2.25) -1.1695 (13.30) 
Latvia  .6578 (7.89)  -.2165 (2.49)  .1953 (8.92)  -1.5730 (17.94) 
Lithuania  .0006 (0.01)   .9632 (11.05)  .1422 (6.46) -1.8912 (21.48) 
Luxembourg -.3927 (3.62)   .6086 (5.82) -.0041 (0.15)  .5996 (5.50) 
Macedonia  .0895 (1.05) 1.7473 (19.10)  .1491 (6.74)   -1.4650 (16.23) 
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Malta  .8118 (7.34)    .2218 (1.97) -.3147 (10.97) -.4782 (4.22) 
Netherlands  .6657 (7.80)  -.1490 (1.80) -.2631 (11.62)  .7077 (7.98) 
Poland  .5324 (6.30)  .7238 (8.23)   .0552 (2.45) -.7725 (8.66) 
Portugal -.4724 (5.27)   .3512 (3.95)  .1618 (7.26) -2.0441 (23.35) 
Romania -.8601 (9.42)  1.0423 (11.45)  -.0617 (2.73) -2.8260 (32.07) 
Slovakia  .2379 (2.78)  1.1254 (13.15)  .1889 (8.67) -.8867 (9.99) 
Slovenia -.0969 (1.13) -.0445 (0.53)  .0713 (3.20) -.3659 (4.14) 
Spain  .3549 (4.07)   .3472 (3.82)  .2510 (11.58) -.4443 (4.96) 
Sweden   2.0228 (23.05)   .9473 (11.35)  .1523 (7.00)  .8669 (9.82) 
Turkish Cyprus  .5669 (4.89)     -1.1993 (10.63) 
Turkey  .1997 (2.21)  .1934 (1.99)  .2080 (9.16)    -.9630 (9.93) 
UK  .6303 (7.79)     .7395 (9.23) -.1200 (5.62)  .7489 (8.93) 
West Germany .3498 (4.16)  -.2990 (3.53) -.0465 (2.06) -.1130 (1.28) 
/cut1  .1006  -1.6815  -3.4753 
/cut2  1.8205  -.0159  -1.7428 
/cut3  2.1023   1.2795 
N                               28,872      25,418   30,215  30,580 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 .0599 .0286 .0625.1505 
 
Source: Eurobarometer #73.4, May 2010. 
Notes: Excluded categories, Age left school<16 and ages 45-54, Belgium; EU national 
and married. T-statistics in parentheses. 
Q1.  What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months 
be better (=3), worse (=2) or the same (=1), when it comes to the employment situation in 
(our country). 
Q2. In a international financial and economic crisis, it is necessary to increase public 
deficits to create jobs Totally agree (=4);; Tend to agree (=3); Tend to disagree (=2); 
Totally disagree (=1). 
Q3.  What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the 
moment - unemployment? 
Q4.  On the whole, are you very satisfied (=4), fairly satisfied (=3), not very satisfied 
(=2) or not at all satisfied (=1) with the life you lead? 
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Table 9.  Characteristics of individuals in the NCDS according to number of months unemployed between ages 16 and 23 
 
   Number of months unemployed  
  0                 >0 & <3          ≥3 & < 6    ≥6 & <12        ≥12 & <24            ≥24  
Social class (1958) - I 5 5 4 4 3 2 
Social class (1958) - II 14 13 15 12 9 3 
Social class (1958) - III - nonmanual 11 10 9 8 9 6 
Social class (1958) - III - manual 51 49 50 52 50 50  
Social class (1958) - IV 11 15 11 13 15 16 
Social class (1958) - V 7 9 10 11 15 23  
IQ score at 11 45.3 45.0 43.1 42.5 38.0 32.7 
Math score at 11 18.0 17.9 16.3 16.2 13.6 10.5 
Reading score at 16 26.3 26.4 25.7 25.0 22.9 19.9 
Math score at 16 13.6 13.5 12.6 12.1 10.2 8.7 
Malaise score at 23 2.48 2.67 2.94 3.27 3.65 4.21 
Malaise score at 50 1.36 1.43 1.52 1.86 1.96 2.22 
Unemployed at age 33 (%) 1.1 0.6 1.1 3.0 2.5 9.5 
Unemployed at age 42 (%) 1.1 1.5 1.8 4.1 4.5 8.9 
Unemployed at age 50 (%) 1.6 1.7 3.3 4.1 4.4 10.0 
Very difficult financially at 50 (%) 1.6 3.3 1.9 5.4 6.6 5.0 
Happy at 50 3.54 3.51 3.46 3.4 3.27 3.19 
Life satisfaction at 50 7.45 7.28 7.09 7.1 6.92 6.63 
Gross weekly pay at 50 £592 £578 £501 £479 £428 £373 
No academic qualification at 50 (%) 15.1 15.9 16.4 21.4 30.8 51.0 
 
Notes; 'Very difficult financially' refers to an individual's assessment of their personal situation.  Social class refers to mother's 
husband in the Perinatal Mortality Study in 1958. 
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Table 10.  Log weekly wages in 2008/2009 at age 50  
 
                                                         (1)                     (2)                        (3)                    
Months unemployed ≤23-.0138 (10.00)  -.0092 (8.10) -.0090 (7.15)  
Male .6813 (35.73) .3263 (17.15) .3183 (15.63) 
Unemployed in 2004   -.1249 (1.50)  
 
Part-time dummy  No Yes Yes  
Permanent job dummy   No Yes Yes  
Region dummies (10) No Yes Yes  
School dummies (8) No Yes Yes  
Industry dummies (59) No Yes Yes  
Workplace size dummies (4)  No Yes Yes  
 
Constant 5.7595 5.3279 5.2758  
 
Adjusted R2 .1878 .5017  .4923  
N 5,879                 5,878                 5,309            
 
Source: National Child Development Study, 1958 birth cohort 
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Table 11.  Happiness in 2008/2009 at age 50  
 
                                                      (1)                     (3)                   
Months unemployed ≤23-.0051 (5.38) -.0048 (4.38)  
Unemployed in 2004   -.0856 (1.21)  
Unemployed in 2000  -.0659 (1.03)   
Part-time employee   -.0052 (0.24)  -.0008 (0.04)   
Full-time self-employed    .0243 (1.02)  .0147 (0.57)  
Part-time self-employed   -.0523 (1.14)  -.0965 (1.96)   
Unemployed    -.1876 (3.90)  -.0454 (0.77)  
Full-time education   -.1900 (1.28)  -.2397 (1.59)  
Government scheme    -.5055 (1.11)  -.7448 (1.17)  
Temporarily sick/disabled   -.0828 (0.85) -.0352 (0.34)  
Permanently sick/disabled  -.3755 (10.16) -.3842 (9.09)  
Looking after home/family  -.1183 (3.57) -.1040 (2.93)    
Wholly retired           -.1144 (1.37)  -.1516 (1.62)   
Other LF status      .0075 (0.11)    .0010 (0.02) 
Male    -.0741 (4.61)  -.0629 (4.02)  
Takes daily exercise     .0482 (2.83)  .0445 (2.43)  
Smoker    -.0991 (5.17)  -.1024 (4.94)  
 
Constant     3.2761                    3.2970  
 
Adjusted R2 .0798 .0727 
N 8,4267,234         6,679 
 
Source: National Child Development Study - 1958 birth cohort 
Notes: All equations include 10 region dummies, 5 marital status dummies and 8 schooling 
dummies. Excluded category full-time employees.  Instruments in columns 2 and 4 are the 
proportion of children in the child's school whose parents are in non-manual occupations 
obtained from the educational interview provided by the school when the respondent was 
age 16.  Results are reported in 8 bands - the first 7 were in 10% intervals and the last 
80%+ so seven dummies are included as instruments.  T-statistics in parentheses.   
 
Question. 'On balance I look back on life with a sense of happiness (n=9,845). Never=1%; 
not often=7%; sometimes= 34% and often 58%. 
 
